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2 February 1961

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STATUS OF EVIDENCE ON SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE PRODUCTION

- I. It is not yet possible to identify firmly the Soviet facilities engaged in MRBM and ICBM production; therefore, conclusions with respect to the location, magnitude and pace of the production program depend primarily on indirect and frequently ambiguous information.
- II. Relatively good evidence over many years indicates that a research institute/experimental factory complex just north of Moscow (NII/Plant No. 88, Kaliningrad) has been the research and development center for Soviet ballistic missiles since 1946.
  - A. It probably manufactured the initial developmental MRBMs and ICBMs launched from Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam, including boosters for Soviet space vehicles.
  - B. The complex has been expanded considerably in the past four years and possesses design departments, extensive manufacturing area, and test, checkout, and static firing installations.
    1. Slightly larger than Martin facility near Denver where U.S. Titan designed, developed, and produced.
    2. Activities at Kaliningrad have encompassed a wider variety of missile types.
  - C. In keeping with past practice the Kaliningrad complex most recently would have been engaged in prototype production of the 2,000 n.m. ballistic missiles tested from Kapustin Yar in last half 1960, and possibly some production for space vehicle attempts.
  - D. A companion facility at Khimki, also near Moscow, has a similar

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role in the development and prototype production of propulsion systems.

1. It probably manufactures and supplies the propulsion units used in missiles fabricated at Kaliningrad.

III. Direct information on the current pace and specific nature of activity at these developmental facilities is very meager.

- A. Therefore, not possible to confirm status of current programs for various ballistic missiles on basis of knowledge of these facilities.
- B. Historically, missiles developed in central Moscow complexes have been placed into quantity or series production at other facilities.

IV. Production of less than one ICBM per month would have been sufficient to supply the ICBMs and space vehicles fired at Tyuratam during 18 months from mid-1957 through 1958.

- A. This rate is consistent with that normally associated with an experimental plant, and adds weight to belief that Kaliningrad was the producer.

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VIII. The cities of Dnepropetrovsk, Kyivbyshev and Sverdlovsk are suspected as the location of series production facilities for Soviet long-range missiles, even though, from the fragmentary and often ambiguous information available, the specific facilities cannot be firmly identified. There are numerous other cities which are linked even less firmly to the Soviet missile production program.

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1. Although photography of the city in late 1959 did not enable us to identify an ICBM production facility, it did reveal a static test installation under construction, probably for rocket engines of more than a million pounds thrust -- this signifies an expanding role for Kuybyshev in the ICBM/space program.

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- C. At Sverdlovsk, a former artillery plant (No. 8) is suspected of ICBM or space vehicle involvement

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converted to ballistic missile production in 1958.

the plant was

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1. Mid-1959 photography, however, failed to reveal either the nature of current production at the plant, or any external evidence of missile production.
2. Based on present evidence it is not yet possible to determine the scope of missile production at Sverdlovsk, beyond the probable fabrication of space vehicles such as LUNIK.

IX. There is no basis at present for judging that principal components for ballistic missile systems necessarily produced by a particular type of industrial facility in the USSR. Other Soviet missiles have been produced in such various facilities as an armaments plant, an automobile plant, and an airframe plant.

- A. Electronic equipment and instrumentation requirements appear to

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come from producers normally associated with such equipment.

- B. In the case of ground support equipment, the Soviets have produced launcher-erector type equipment in a heavy machinery plant and in an airframe plant which was still producing fighter aircraft.
- X. For the most part, the physical requirements of the missile industry can probably be met by existing Soviet industrial facilities, after the necessary expansion or conversion of individual installations, although some new construction might be undertaken to meet specialized needs.
- A. The limited evidence which is presently available suggests that converted facilities are being used for Soviet missile production and that these facilities have been selected from several different industries.

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STATUS OF EVIDENCE ON SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

ICBM

- I. The continuing lack of conclusive evidence of Soviet ICBM deployment is perhaps our most serious intelligence problem because it renders us unable to substantiate directly our estimates of the status, pace and magnitude of the buildup of Soviet operational forces.
  - A. The lack of evidence reflects the limited intelligence coverage of the most probable areas of ICBM deployment (particularly of the initial deployment of the heavy nosecone, limited range weapon)

- C. In our judgment, the absence of evidence is attributable to the limitations of the information available to date; we do not believe that it can be interpreted to signify only that little or no ICBM deployment is underway in the USSR, at least until such time as intelligence coverage is substantially more extensive than at present.

- II. Evidence suggests the possibility of ICBM site construction since 1957 at several locations in the northwestern USSR.



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1. Although there is scattered evidence of unidentified missile deployment in the Carpathian Military District prior to 1960, we now have reliable observational evidence of substantial liquid oxygen (LOX) shipments to the vicinity of Mukachevo (see Map) in August 1960.
2. The quantities involved indicate the deployment of new units in the area, which at that date would probably have been equipped with the 1,100 n.m. missile.

700 N. M.

VII. Although no deployment sites for the 700 n.m. ballistic missile system (SHYSTER) have been positively identified, its deployment in quantity is indicated by sightings of SHYSTER missile convoys on freight trains in the USSR in 1959 and scattered reports of sightings in the Baltic area of the USSR and East Germany of missiles answering the description of SHYSTER, beginning in early 1959.

- A. We believe that the presence of the SHYSTER in East Germany indicates earlier deployment of this system within the borders of the USSR.
- B. Continued reports of SHYSTER sightings in both the USSR and in East Germany lead us to conclude that deployment of the 700 n.m. weapon system is still under way.

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